On EU-Russia Strategy

(based on intervention at the Wilfried Martens Centre Academic Council’s Conference)

Introduction

It is quite a coincidence that we are discussing Russia and our long-term strategy towards it at almost the same time as the world is talking about peace negotiations in Abu Dhabi.

Peace in Ukraine is urgently needed.

But we also need sustainable, long-term peace across the entire European continent.

In my view, that will depend fundamentally on Russia’s long-term future. And that is the subject of our discussion today.

I do not believe that we can build any kind of “European security architecture” with Putin’s Russia. We had a European security architecture that included Russia after the Cold War. We had initiatives to “reset” relations with Putin. But none of that stopped him from launching his war against Ukraine. Today, I am much more concerned with how to build a European defence architecture against an aggressive Russia than how to build anything together with Putin.

Europe faces two alternatives. The first is to live under the permanent threat of an aggressive, authoritarian Russia. The second is the possibility that, in the longer term, a different Russia might emerge – a Russia capable of returning to normality.

The first option does not require us to develop any kind of a long-term strategy for Russia’s transformation. But it does require us to invest ever more in a “defensive wall” against authoritarian Russia. And it would leave our grandchildren living under a permanent and growing threat of an authoritarian Russia.

The second option – the possibility of Russia returning to normality – requires from us a clear long-term strategy. We still do not have one. And that is our mistake.

We managed to preserve peace in Europe throughout the Cold War with the “NATO wall” against the Soviet empire. Today, we are building a wall with a stronger European pillar  inside NATO against an aggressive, authoritarian Russia.

But is that the only way to achieve sustainable peace on the European continent?

In my view, Europe’s long-term strategy towards Russia needs a two-track approach: we must build the defensive wall of NATO’s European pillar while, at the same time, we need to invest in the second option.

Let me offer some personal reflections on why we need that second option – and a long-term strategy to make it possible.

Before turning to the details of a long term strategy, however, I want to express one concern. As soon as peace would be established in Ukraine, there will be a strong temptation in the West to pursue “Reset 2.0” and return to “business as usual” with Putin. That will have negative long-term consequences for Russia and for Europe, but I am not so sure that we will have sufficient political will to resist the temptation.

That makes it all the more important to discuss openly what our long-term strategy towards Russia should be, and whether we can expect a different Russia to emerge in the future.

Why do we need a strategy for Russia’s long-term future?

The enduring tectonic conflict between authoritarian Russia and democratic Europe is a major security threat to the European continent. Because of Russia’s aggressive behaviour.

Let me recall that, in the first half of the twentieth century, Europe was marked by two major tectonic conflicts: one between Germany and France, and the other between Soviet Russia, after 1917, and the rest of Europe.

The first conflict, between Germany and France, was a major cause of the First and Second World Wars. It was resolved only after the Second World War, through the creation of NATO and the European Community.

The second conflict, between authoritarian Russia and democratic Europe, remains unresolved. It continues to threaten democratic Europe as a whole, and Russia’s neighbours in particular.

The countries sometimes labelled “Russophobic”, such as the Baltic states, have the greatest interest in resolving this enduring conflict and establishing normal relations with Russia. These smaller countries are usually the ones that suffer most when the conflict erupts into another wave of Russian aggression. We don’t need reminding that such aggression has repeatedly characterised the behaviour of authoritarian Russia.

Normal relations with Russia will be possible only if Russia changes – if it returns to being a normal country.

What would it mean for Russia to become a normal country?

In my view, it would mean a Russia that stops to be aggressive towards its neighbours and towards its own citizens.

How that can be achieved, and whether it requires the immediate establishment of a perfect democracy, are questions for Russians themselves to decide and realize.

But what Russians will decide, and what they will be able to achieve, will depend also to a significant extent on what we, as Europeans, do. Will we invest in a long-term strategy to support such a transformation? Or will we remain indifferent and passive when it comes to the prospect of sustainable peace on our continent?

Three questions for our strategy

Before examining in greater detail what kind of strategy towards Russia we need, let us answer three very simple but very strategic questions.

First question: Do we believe that Russia can transform itself and return to normality – or do we not?

I belong to the minority who believe that Russia can become different. I presented the arguments for this belief in my 2022 article, “Our ‘Russian’ Psychological Complexes” (https://andriuskubilius.lt/en/our-russian-psychological-complexes/). I will not repeat all those arguments here. But we must recognise a simple truth: if we do not believe that Russia can change, there is no point in discussing the second option or developing a long-term strategy to make it a reality.

Second question: Even if we believe that Russia can undergo a transformation, do we want it to happen – or are we afraid of it?

Europe’s problem is a not entirely rational fear that Russia’s transformation could produce an even worse outcome: a leadership more brutal than Putin, the fragmentation or collapse of the Russian state, the loss of control over nuclear weapons, and so on.

Putin exploits this fear in the West and deliberately amplifies it, with one objective: to convince Western leaders that the Putin they know is preferable to the unknown future of Russia’s future transformation.

Of course, a transformation in Russia could have unpredictable consequences. But Russia could also collapse if there will be no positive transformation, because its current long-term trajectory is profoundly negative.

I am personally convinced that even if the probability of Russia’s positive transformation and return to normality were only 1%, it would still be worthwhile for Europe to invest in that possibility through a deliberate strategy.

Third question: Even if we believe that Russia can change, and we are not afraid of that change, are we willing to develop and implement a strategy that could help bring it about?

Putin has a very clear strategy towards the West, and Europe in particular. It is a strategy of hybrid warfare: to threaten, intimidate, escalate and divide our societies and nations, thereby weakening Europe’s political will to defend itself and support Ukraine.

Some might argue that our strategy towards Russia already consists of sanctions, support for Ukraine and the strengthening of our defence readiness.

Yes. These are essential strategic instruments of our defensive response to Russia’s aggressive behaviour.

But we hesitate to be more proactive in supporting Russia’s transformation or to define a clear strategy for doing so. We fear that Putin will respond with further escalation. Yet our fear of escalation only encourages Putin to escalate further.

My answers to these three questions are therefore straightforward:

• We should believe that Russia can be different and be able to transform back to normality.
• We should not be afraid of the possibility of Russia’s transformation, even though we cannot predict its outcome in advance.
• We should not be afraid to develop and implement a strategy to support that transformation, even if Putin threatens us with another wave of escalation.

These answers should lead to three clear strategic principles:

• We must build a “wall” of NATO’s strong European pillar to defend ourselves against an aggressive, authoritarian Russia.
• We must develop a strategy to support Russia’s return to normality, and communicate that strategy to the Russian people.
• We must say “no” to attempts of an unconditional “Reset 2.0” with Putin and an unchanged Russia.

Russia’s transformation and Ukraine’s strategic role

Europe, more than any other actor, can play a decisive role in addressing the challenge of Russia’s uncertain future.

It would be a serious mistake for us to remain indifferent to Russia’s future or to assume that the European Union has no influence over Russia’s long-term transformation.

Of course, the European Union cannot and should not attempt to engineer political change inside Russia.

Nevertheless, it is in Europe’s vital strategic interest to encourage developments that could eventually lead Russia back towards a peaceful, responsible and non-aggressive normality.

The European Union has three important instruments that could inspire both Russian society and future Russian leaders to pursue such a transformation.

The first is a sustained European support for Ukraine’s military success.

Russians must understand that imperial nostalgia leads not to national greatness, but to millions of personal tragedies – for Russians, not only for Ukrainians – and to a profoundly negative long-term trajectory for Russia itself.

The second is a  sustained European support for Ukraine’s economic and social success through its integration into the European Union.

Like the success created by European integration in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states after the Cold War.

Ukraine’s integration can begin with  integration of Ukraine’s battle tested military experience, which is also a vital interest of Europe.

The success of a prosperous, democratic and European Ukraine could eventually inspire Russians to recognise that “Putin’s way” is not the only possible way for long term development of their country. A more successful future is possible for Russia too. But it requires Russia to return back to normality – and back to normal relations with its European neighbours.

We need to understand that our strategy towards Ukraine has a much broader strategic significance. Ukraine’s success depends on our support, and that success offers a path towards a different Russia.

The third instrument in our “Russia transformation toolbox” is a clear, publicly articulated long-term European strategy, developed and communicated now, that defines the future of EU-Russia relations once Russia has returned to normality.

Europe should make its position clear: renewed access to European markets, trade and economic cooperation will be possible only when Russia becomes a normal country—a peaceful and responsible state.

We must recognise that the European Union can help create the conditions for Russia’s eventual return back to normality.

In doing so, it would fulfil one of our greatest strategic responsibilities to future generations: contributing to lasting peace on the European continent.

The alternative is a permanently aggressive Russia—and a permanent  threat of Russia to the security of Europe.