On a New Defence Architecture in Europe: European Defence Union and European Security Council
I recently wrote that the Commission President’s State of the Union Address marked a breakthrough in European defence.
In my view, the Address above all represents a clear attempt to overcome the legacy of Europe’s long-established defence mentality. It sends a powerful message: the status quo in our thinking, doctrines and decision-making is no longer an option when considering the future of European defence readiness.
The Commission President’s message was clear: the time has come for a “big bang” in institutional defence readiness. We cannot achieve an adequate level of material defence readiness without also ensuring institutional defence readiness.
Institutional defence readiness concerns how we organise ourselves to defend the European continent. Material defence readiness concerns how we invest, produce and procure for our defence so that we are ready “to fight tonight”.
Ursula von der Leyen was very clear in her State of the Union Address: we face a crisis of the status quo in today’s defence architecture of the European continent: “… our doctrine, our institutions and our decision-making have not kept pace with the new reality. Our systems were made for a different world. They are driven by well-intentioned attempts at consensus and compromise. But we need to consider whether they are still fit for purpose.”
And the Commission President offers a bold idea for overcoming this status quo crisis – for achieving a “big bang” in the development of European institutional defence readiness: “This is why we will set out our ideas to make a European Security Council [with partners like Canada, Norway, Ukraine, the United Kingdom]- a reality. The urgency is clear.”
The European Security Council thus emerges as a clear proposal for how to “keep pace with the new reality”.
This is a clear call for “big bang” reforms in our institutional defence readiness.
These “big bang” reforms in Europe’s institutional defence readiness are not intended to replace NATO on the European continent. They concern Europe’s defence architecture, not NATO’s. Whatever new defence architecture emerges in Europe, it must be an integral part of NATO, strengthening its European pillar and making the transatlantic defence partnership more balanced and stable.
These ideas announced by the Commission President will certainly not materialise immediately. There will be discussions, different ideas and proposals about how to establish the Security Council and how it should operate. Ideas of this kind already exist and are being widely discussed today, just as similar proposals were announced and debated much earlier.
Many papers by experts, politicians, parliamentarians and political leaders have been devoted to the idea of a European Security Council. In recent years, I have published and spoken publicly on more than one occasion about this kind of institutional defence readiness and about a European Security Council.
The idea of a European Security Council and the related concept of a European Defence Union are gaining broad support among major stakeholders, including European institutions and national governments. Similar ideas have also been actively discussed, formally and informally, in the European Parliament through parliamentary reports, resolutions and other initiatives.
Some national leaders, like E. Macron or A. Merkel, were among the first to speak, almost ten years ago, about the need for a European Security Council.
At the beginning of this year, Germany’s CDU, under the leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, included support for a European Security Council in its party programme.
Guido Crosetto, Italy’s Defence Minister, is actively promoting the idea of a Continental European Defence Community.
The European People’s Party, in its Summit Statement of 18 June 2026, supported by 14 Heads of State representing the EPP, made a strong statement: the EU “need[s] a European Security Council involving also like-minded non-EU countries”.
The details of the proposal for a European Security Council may become clearer after the European Security Strategy, which is being prepared by the Commission President and the HRVP, is published.
But even before the details emerge, we need to understand why institutional transformation is necessary in Europe, and what form it should take, if we are to be ready for defence and for the tasks of “NATO 3.0”.
To implement the “NATO 3.0” concept on the European continent, we need a “Europe 3.0” concept for European defence architecture, with Europe taking primary leadership in its own conventional defence.
In my view, we urgently need to address two major issues in designing a new European defence architecture fit for the challenges of the new reality and the “NATO 3.0” concept.
First, we need a broader geographical basis for this architecture. Second, we need an appropriate framework for collective political leadership and effective decision-making.
The answer to these two major issues lies in establishing a European Security Council and a European Defence Union. The two are closely interlinked and should be established together.
The names of these two structures may differ, but their purpose should remain the same: an institutional arrangement that enables all European democracies, should they wish, to unite within a new defence architecture, and an institutional arrangement that provides effective political leadership within it.
First issue: The geographical basis of a new European defence architecture — European Defence Union
In her State of the Union Address, the Commission President made it clear that the basis of Europe’s defence architecture must extend beyond the European Union itself. She spoke of the need to integrate countries such as Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada into a new European defence architecture.
We therefore need to broaden the geographical basis of this new architecture. It should include not only EU Member States, but also the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Norway and Canada, all on an equal footing.
The logic is straightforward: integrating these countries’ defence capabilities would make European defence much stronger, particularly given Ukraine’s battle-tested experience.
Some may argue that the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada are already NATO members and are therefore fully integrated with their European partners in European defence. On that basis, they may see no need for additional European institutions.
In the second part of this paper, I explain why NATO structures cannot replace the need for a dedicated European political – not military – platform where Europeans can independently discuss European defence, including how to build and strengthen NATO’s European pillar.
The EU already has a Defence Council within the Foreign Affairs Council. The defence ministers of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland also hold informal but influential meetings in the “E5+” format, where they develop common positions for broader NATO or EU discussions. These European arrangements each add value to Europe’s defence without competing with NATO or diminishing the role of its institutions.
More importantly, we must understand what would happen if “day X” arrived and Putin launched another act of aggression against EU or NATO Member States. The countries on NATO’s eastern flank, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would be the first to face a battle-tested Russian army capable of deploying 10 million drones a year (around 30,000 a day), supported by a Russian war economy able to outproduce the European defence industry. Russia is now much stronger than it was in 2022.
On our side, only Ukraine has a comparably battle-tested and experienced military force, as well as a battle-tested and highly innovative defence industry.
That is why we Europeans must recognise our vital interest in fully integrating Ukrainian defence capabilities with European defence capabilities as soon as possible.
We have no time to waste. Failing to pursue such integration would be a major strategic mistake.
How can we achieve such rapid integration?
Let us be realistic: NATO membership is not currently available to Ukraine, while full membership of the European Union is a complex process that cannot guarantee the rapid integration of Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
For these reasons, the most effective solution may be a new institutional arrangement that brings together the defence capabilities of the democratic European continent on a single platform.
That is the main reason why we need a European Defence Union: to integrate the defence capabilities of Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada with those of willing EU Member States.
The Commission President in her State of the Union Address used different terminology, and called for establishing a new institutional framework: a European Security Council which besides EU Member States would include also Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada. I call for a similar new institutional framework, but I name it – European Defence Union.
Different stakeholders (European Parliament, national Governments, experts) from time to time use those two titles of European Security Council or European Defence Union interchangeably in order to describe the same institutional arrangement: to have a broad political platform which would unite European democracies for the defence of Europe.
I will continue to call it European Defence Union.
How to create a European Defence Union?
If we are just considering how to invite Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada to participate in some existing EU institutional formats, like the European Council of Heads of State or to EU Foreign Affairs Council devoted to Defence (so called EU Defence Council), and to call such a meeting European Defence Union (or European Security Council) – its easy to do.
If those invited will accept the invitation, they can be present in those formats, but they will not be equal to EU Member States. They will be able to participate in the discussions, but they will not be able to vote and their implementation of agreed decisions will be only voluntary.
It’s also not difficult to invite all the countries to participate in an informal gathering, devoted to defence and called European Defence Union (or European Security Council), but such an informal meeting will not be very much different from the meetings of the existing European Political Community.
If we are looking for a new European defence architecture, in the form of a European Defence Union, which has not only informal powers and with equal participation of every country, which wants to join the Defence Union, then we need to understand that it will be impossible to squeeze such a European Defence Union into the existing Treaty on European Union. Because the Treaty on European Union cannot be applied to countries like Ukraine, United Kingdom, Norway or Canada.
In that case, would a new Intergovernmental Treaty on European Defence Union be the best approach? As was the case with the Schengen Treaty?
My answer is: yes!
Because all other attempts to find in existing EU treaties some kind of enhanced cooperation articles for such a Defence Union to be created, first of all, would leave non-EU countries in legally unknown territory. And it would not create equality among EU and non-EU members of the Defence Union.
The European Defence Union should be established voluntarily among the countries which want much stronger cooperation on European defence, much more unity in defence, which is now not available on the European continent.
The initiation of a European Defence Union through a new intergovernmental treaty can be started in the same way as the Schengen Treaty was created, by the countries who really want to create a European Defence Union, with the agreement that the initial threshold for the new treaty to become valid would be 15 EU Member States to sign the treaty. Then others would, maybe, follow to join the treaty later on.
A European Defence Union, in my view, should be built around the principle of Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union on mutual assistance in the event of military aggression against one of the Member States. It’s worth remembering the words of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who during the Munich Security Conference of this year convincingly spoke about Article 42(7) as the basis for a European pillar of NATO, which he said should be, “separable but not separate” from NATO. And he also spoke about Article 42(7) in his proposal for Ukrainian integration towards the EU.
The European Defence Union will not contradict NATO and will not compete with NATO in the same way as the European Union does not contradict and does not compete with NATO. Some members of the European Defence Union maybe will not be members of NATO, but as an organisation the European Defence Union should be in a very strong cooperation with NATO. As the European Union is.
Again we can remember what Chancellor Friedrich Merz earlier this year said about the European Defence Union: the “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has called for the European Union to transform into a full-fledged European Defense Union, urging Europe to take greater responsibility for its security amid evolving global challenges”
And finally, we need to remember that the establishment of a genuine European Defence Union is the official goal of this European Commission. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her political guidelines for this mandate promised to build a “real European Defence Union”.
My Mission Letter, which I received from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the very beginning of the mandate of this Commission, speaks also very clearly: “I would like you to bring all of this work together under a true European Defence Union, /…/“.
When European Defence Union will be established it will be a distinct international organisation with its own legal personality, organs, budget and decisions.
The relationship in between of European Union and European Defence Union should be governed by the special protocol on the relationship between the European Defence Union and the European Union, including access to Union institutional expertise, programmes and services. Also, the European Defence Union shall seek a framework agreement with the European Union, concluded through the appropriate Union procedures, to define the services, authorisations, costs, liability, oversight and security arrangements necessary to implement the Protocol.
In a similar way additional protocol should define the partnership and cooperation in between of European Defence Union and NATO.
In addition, here can be a need of additional protocol, which establishes transitional arrangements governing the participation of Ukraine in the European Defence Union, taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising from the ongoing conflict.
Second issue. On effective political leadership for new European defence architecture: European Security Council
The new intergovernmental treaty on European Defence Union would make it possible also to establish much more effective decision-making procedures on European defence issues, with qualified majority voting on most issues related to European defence, which now is impossible according to the existing treaties of the European Union.
That would be a big step towards what Germany and France now are asking to do with decision-making on EU foreign and security policy issues. And what Foreign Affairs Minister of Germany Johan Wadephul is so convincingly arguing for. And what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called as “decision making” created during peace time which is no longer fit for purpose.
The new intergovernmental treaty would allow also to establish effective governance institutions of the European Defence Union, which would make it possible to have a balanced mixture of “bottom-up” and “top down” principles realised in “institutional defence readiness” on the European continent.
This balanced mixture can be created if the European Defence Union will have two key institutions for its governance: a General Assembly (Council of Ministers) of all the Member States of European Defence Union and a smaller, “E5+” type leadership body, which in my previous statements and articles I called the European Security Council.
It’s absolutely clear that the new European defence architecture needs to be effective in its capability to implement new defence doctrines and in decision-making. That is why we need an “E5+” type European Security Council as a leadership body for the European Defence Union, which could work in synergy with the broader General Assembly of all the members of the European Defence Union.
The titles of the institutions can be different, but essence and functions should be very clear: the General Assembly is for representation of all the members of European Defence Union, the European Security Council for the political leadership.
What kind of legal and political powers the General Assembly and European Security Council will have, the details of the synergy and balance between the two institutions will be decided during the preparation of the intergovernmental treaty.
Now it is time to present the arguments why this kind of leadership in the form of smaller European Security Council will be beneficial for a new European defence architecture.
First of all, we need to remember that there are two major reasons, why we need to talk about new European defence architecture: the first is the Russian war against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s threats to European security; and second, the United States’ decision to diminish their participation in European defence, asking Europeans to take primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe.
“NATO 3.0” concept is a new reality. It was approved and supported by the NATO Summit in Ankara.
It means that we, as Europe, need to be ready for substantial American withdrawal of their resources from European continent.
Europeans will make a big mistake if they do not pay substantial attention to what kind of structural challenges this kind of withdrawal will create for European collective defence capabilities. These challenges will not be mitigated by US announcements that despite the fact that they are withdrawing from Europe, they will stay with some of their troops in Poland.
As is rightly pointed out by Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz, the biggest challenge for Europeans will be not the replacement of American military inventory or military troops, but the replacement of American political leadership in European defence:
“Thus far, some European leaders seem to have persuaded themselves that managing US withdrawal is a mix of money and material: Europe simply has to buy what it would otherwise lose. /…/ Before buying kit, however, Europe must replace something harder to substitute: US political and military leadership. The US has been the centre of gravity due to its military and economic power, enabling NATO collective strategy and military operations. Without the ability and authority to lead, more weapons would be useless: who decides what to buy, based on which defence plans, and who authorises the use of weapons?”
It is obvious that primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe, which Europeans need to be ready to take, demands also proper political leadership from Europeans. It demands “Europe 3.0” defence architecture with the institutions ready for primary leadership. Without this kind of leadership it will be impossible to realise “primary responsibility”.
What is needed for such leadership to be realised European leaders suggested and proposed more than once during the last decade. It was done by J.C.Juncker, by E. Macron, by A.Merkel.
The question is – why did it not happen?
One of the possible answers to the question “why it did not happen?” has been proposed by Max Bergman, director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. He argues that until now the United States has resisted European initiatives to strengthen their own defence capabilities: “After all, the biggest opponent of an integrated European defense, of the European Union doing anything on defense, or of NATO creating a European pillar was the United States. This leaves Europe in the lurch.”
The same was recently repeated by the famous Finnish General Gustav Hägglund, the first Chairman of the European Military Committee, who during the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the EU Military Committee told the story how as Chairman he had promoted the idea to create a European Defence Union as a European pillar of NATO, but the initiative failed at that time and one of the reasons was: “the United States were reluctant to see the EU to develop itself into a potential competitor in international affairs”.
So, today we need to draw a clear conclusion: at the moment, the major problem with the transformation of European defence is not material, not lack of investment or shortage of defence production. The major problem is institutional: there are no effective institutional platforms where European political discussions and decisions can be made on the major issues, related to the development of defence policies at the European level. That is why we need to learn not only how to increase our defence spending or how to ramp up defence production, but also how to establish proper formats for our political leadership on the issues of our primary responsibility for European defence. Times are different, – now transatlantic partners are asking us to take such a responsibility.
Also we need to admit, that today in the EU, individual Member States prefer to concentrate only on their own national defence capabilities. Structural, European level problems of European defence industry – very precisely described in the famous Draghi repor – do not attract enough attention from national decision-makers.
One reason is that defence policies according to EU treaties are considered an issue of national sovereignty. That is why Member States are suspicious of any Commission initiative on European defence, and see in them signs of a “power grab”.
However, it is difficult to expect that only such a bottom-up approach will bring the needed answers at the European level.
So far, voluntary defence cooperation by Member States in the format of PESCO also has not been very fruitful.
And even the Defence Council of 27 Member States, as part of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, does not play a significant role. As has been rightly observed: “… the membership of the EU has grown to 27 and the Union’s competences in security and defence have increased, but the quality of strategic debates between the ministers has decreased. Today, ministers meeting in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) tend to read pre-prepared statements around the table, leaving very little room for in-depth discussion on major long-term strategic challenges.”
Put simply, the primary challenge for European defence is lack of an effective platform for political – not military –leadership in the development of European defence policy and institutional transformation.
The same conclusion is made by Mölling and Schütz: “Europe cannot implement an effective security strategy without a more unified political leadership.” They stress that defence transformation requires organised political leadership: “A transition strategy into a European Way of War is needed. Besides a different approach to generating war fighting capabilities, industrial bases and spending money, this implies first and foremost a way of organising political leadership that ensures Europe’s security and defence”.
Existing EU institutions and decision-making processes, designed in peacetime, are no longer fit for this purpose. They are not effective and are not able to “keep pace with the new reality”.
The Commission alone cannot serve as this leadership platform. Individual Member States cannot fill the gap either. Nor is the Council, as a collective body of Member States, sufficiently effective in its decision-making or its ability to find “big answers” to “big questions”.
NATO does an excellent job of addressing the military aspects of European collective defence. But it would be difficult to expect NATO, as a transatlantic organisation, to lead the political transformation of European defence, build European independence and establish an effective platform for European political leadership on defence matters.
An answer how to create “unified political leadership” could be built on experience of informal EU decision-making on defence policy. A bigger and bigger role is now being played by the informal leadership formats of the E5+ where usually German, French, Italian, British, Polish defence ministers come together to discuss the most important and urgent European issues: security guarantees to Ukraine; relations with the United States; defence capability developments in Europe. Usually, they are joined by the leadership or representatives from the Commission and from the Council.
Already in practice, this smaller leadership format has proved to bring added value to the whole European Union. It allows constructive discussions, to maintain a security dialogue with the United Kingdom, to create consensus in the dialogue with the United States and to agree on support to Ukraine. The leadership of the E5+ format and the political positions elaborated there are usually supported and followed by a broader “coalition of willing”.
Such an informal gathering could become even more important if it were at least partly formalised.
This could be realised by revitalising suggestions for a European Security Council, as was put forward by French President Macron and then German Chancellor Angela Merkel between 2017 and 2019.
Already in 2018 Chancellor Merkel pointed out that such a Council could be very effective in taking swift action: “I have proposed that we establish a European Security Council with rotating member state membership, in which important decisions could be more swiftly prepared”.
Today, the task of “swiftly preparing important decisions” is becoming the most important responsibility of European leadership.
We need to move beyond repeating prepared statements, towards the urgent, effective implementation of major reforms in European defence.
Establishing a European Security Council in the near future is the best way to create “unified political leadership” for Europe, capable of preparing the long-awaited major institutional transformation of defence on the European continent.
A European Security Council established by the European Defence Union could take different forms.
The European Security Council could include the most influential permanent members (the E5: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Poland), potentially with Ukraine also becoming a permanent member; the EU leadership (the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council); and three rotating EU Member States, including the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU.
The European Security Council would meet at the highest level of heads of state or government, while meetings of defence and foreign ministers would also play important roles.
In brief, such a European Security Council would be responsible for:
a) European crisis management in the event of military aggression against EU Member States (Article 42(7) TEU);
b) coordinating policies to reduce fragmentation in the European defence industry and develop pan-European defence projects;
c) developing proposals how to build a strong “European pillar of NATO”;
d) developing proposals for the strengthening of the European Defence Union;
e)integrating Ukraine’s defence capabilities into the European Defence Union.
Let us recall that President Macron and Chancellor Merkel first raised the idea of a European Security Council in 2017–2019, motivated by the strategic desire to maintain defence and security relations with the United Kingdom after Brexit.
The idea did not materialise at the time. However, Russia’s war against Ukraine gave it new momentum, leading to the E5+ format and its focus on key issues, including security guarantees for Ukraine. The E5+ platform has demonstrated real added value in discussing and reaching agreement on the most important issues.
In these dangerous times, we clearly need a similar platform to discuss strategic issues concerning the future of European defence. There is an urgent need to establish a clearer institutional and legal basis for united European political leadership on defence. That is why the idea of a European Security Council deserves a new lease of life.
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These are the arguments for establishing a European Defence Union and a European Security Council: to provide the broadest possible geographical basis for a new European defence architecture and effective collective political leadership within it. We need this “big bang” in institutional defence readiness because without institutions, decision-making and doctrines, fit for today’s challenges, we will not achieve common defence readiness. Nor will we deter Putin.
It is time to implement the ideas debated across Europe over the past decade about how to make Europe stronger and more independent in defence. These ideas were first articulated by European leaders such as Jean-Claude Juncker, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel. They now enjoy strong support in the European Commission, the European Parliament and many national governments, as well as among experts on both sides of the Atlantic and a majority of European citizens.
To those who still doubt the need for such a “big bang” in institutional defence readiness, fearing that a stronger European defence architecture and a stronger European pillar of NATO – separable but not separate from NATO – might somehow weaken the Alliance, I would say this: a weak Europe makes NATO weaker; a stronger Europe will make NATO and our transatlantic partnership stronger.
Some of the so-called “smaller” European countries fear that a European Security Council with limited membership, modelled on the E5+ format, would exclude them from decision-making within the European Defence Union.
My answer is clear: “smaller” European countries have an even greater interest in effective collective European defence. Such defence is impossible without a platform for effective European political leadership.
“Smaller” countries must understand that the status quo is not a solution, as the Commission President stressed in her State of the Union Address. Either we establish effective new platforms for political leadership and broaden the geographical basis of European defence, or the “bigger” European countries will increasingly turn to informal E5+ formats, where real decisions will be agreed without the participation of “smaller” countries.
Let me repeat: the European Defence Union will need two governing institutions – the General Assembly, in which all members, including the “smaller” ones, are represented, and a smaller but influential European Security Council. The two institutions must work in synergy and safeguard the rights of smaller members.
Coming myself from a “smaller” country, Lithuania, I always remember the strong message of my good friend Radek Sikorski: “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity” – which he said during a speech in Berlin on November 28, 2011, at the height of the European debt crises.
I can repeat those words slightly differently: “I fear the collective political leadership of big European countries in European defence less than I am beginning to fear the lack of such leadership”.
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We are living through a century of profound turbulence.
The transformations in European defence, such as “NATO 3.0” and “Europe 3.0” are transformations, which happen only once in a hundred years.
Today we are witnessing the crisis of the status quo in the defence architecture of European Union.
Jean Monnet once observed that the European community would be built through crises and would become the sum of the solutions adopted in response to those crises.
Until now, this formula has accurately described the evolution of the European Community and later the European Union. Each successive crisis has made Europe stronger, more united, with new common institutions and policies.
The current crisis of the status quo should lead to the same result.
The European Union will emerge from this period stronger and more united in all those areas where the existing status quo has become an obstacle to further progress.
We should not fear this organic evolution of the European Union.
Let us not be afraid of becoming a closer union. Let us not be afraid of unity – including in defence.
On the contrary, we should welcome the opportunity to live through the period in which Europe matures and assumes primary responsibility for its own future.
Not only in defence.
