Navigating the New Transatlantic Playbook

(Based on the comments during W.Martens Center discussion on 2025.04.28, in Valencia)

As EU Commissioner for Defence and Space I am often asked broad questions about security challenges. These questions often concern the immediate and longer-term future of our relations with our transatlantic partners, especially on security and defence matters. In answering these questions, I can only give my private opinions and considerations – based on my understanding of my Mission Letter and the political guidelines for European Commission.

The situation today is clear: Russia is the biggest threat to the security of Europe. In Europe we depend heavily on the United States for security, for military support and strategic enablers. The Americans are rightly demanding that we should ourselves invest much more into our own security.

What is not always clear to Europeans, however, is what the Trump administration really, really wants. Peace, but at what cost? Crimea? No NATO Membership for Ukraine? And why? To befriend Russia?

In this unpredictable, evolving situation we need to have a clear European strategy for our transatlantic relationship in the security and defence area, both for the immediate, short term and for the longer term. Mistakes on both sides can have disastrous consequences, not only for ourselves, but for the whole world.

I formulated my understanding of the security challenges which we are facing and will face in Europe already in the very beginning, when I was nominated as Commissioner for Space and Defence in early September 2024, even before the elections in the US. Understanding these challenges also makes clear the tasks ahead of us.

In my view, we face two different time frames with different security challenges:

• The first challenge, most urgent: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the possibility of Russian aggression against EU or NATO Member States before 2030.
• The second challenge is for the longer term – the next decade. China’s rising military power, and as a result, the US shifting its attention more and more to the Indo-Pacific, at the same time diminishing its presence on the European continent.

The White Paper for European Defence and the Rearm Europe initiative – proposed by the Commission in its first 100 days and supported by the Council – clearly focus on urgency, but also include language on preparedness for the second, long term challenge.

As the White Paper says: “…a new international order will be formed in the second half of this decade and beyond”. And that is why we need to act based on our long-term strategy, because “history will not forgive us for inaction”. It’s clear the White Paper is just the beginning of a deeper discussion about the longer-term future.

“Defending Europe is a European task” – in the words of my Mission Letter. Recently, various European experts and leaders have expressed the self-evident truth that 450 million Europeans should not ask 340 million Americans to permanently defend us against 140 million Russians, who are not able to defeat 38 million Ukrainians. Economically we are strong and powerful enough to take our defence into our own hands. But it will take time.

It will not be enough to spend more and to produce more on defence. To defend ourselves it is essential we develop a European security architecture, as stated in my Mission Letter. Our strategic goal is to unite all efforts to strengthen European defence into “a true European Defence Union”.

The European Union is now ready to start on its long-delayed journey to take responsibility for its own security. And on this journey we will face clear challenges: First, how to avoid an immediate, chaotic, and angry transatlantic divorce. Second, how to effectively manage the transition period towards the destination: a clear division of responsibilities, with Europe in charge of its own security.

Unclarity and unpredictability in transatlantic relations will make both of us weaker, not stronger. We need to better understand US concerns and strategies. And we need ourselves to be more clear and open, to help Americans better understand European concerns and strategies.

To Europeans, there are unclarities in three key relationships: US and Ukraine; US and Russia; and US and EU.

1. US and Ukraine – The major questions for Europeans: What is the US strategy on Ukraine? What are the real US priorities? Peace in Ukraine, or future friendship with Russia? Is Ukraine seen as an obstacle to such a friendship?

Certain ideas create clear concerns among Europeans, based on historical experience:

a) Recognition of Crimea’s annexation is seen as a repetition of Munich 1938. Chamberlain’s recognition of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland to achieve peace in Europe only opened the doors for the beginning of the Second World War. Recognition of the fruits of Russian aggression will only be an inspiration for China, Iran, North Korea to become more aggressive.

b) “No NATO” to Ukraine – Russia demands “no NATO”, not out of fear of a NATO invasion through Ukraine, but out of fear NATO will defend Ukraine against Russia’s next aggression. “No-NATO” for Ukraine makes it easier for Russia to plan its next aggression.

c) Dropping US military support to Ukraine. Annually, both the EU and US gave military support of around 40 billion euros (20 billion on each side; less than 0.1% of GDP). It is true that the EU needs to do more to support Ukraine. The EU needs to be ready to double its military support to Ukraine (and so needs to find an additional 20 billion euros). But Europe and Ukraine also need the United States on board.

2. US and Russia:

a) The US shows an interest in good relations with Russia, while at the same time demanding NATO Member States spend 5% of GDP on defence to deter the Russian threat. NATO considers Russia the biggest threat to security and plans to radically ramp-up

preparedness to defend and to deter Russian aggression. To simultaneously befriend the biggest threat and demand spending to deter the biggest threat creates uncertainty.

b) Friendship between the US and Putin’s aggressive Russia will embolden Putin to continue his aggressive policies, will demoralize western democracies; and again will encourage aggression by other authoritarian regimes.

c) Friendship with Russia is possible when normality returns to Russia. We need to have a clear long term strategy on Russia, and concentrate our efforts to help the Russian people to transform their country back towards non-aggressive normality. Normality for Russia is the most important precondition for normal friendly relations with Russia. However, it is Russia that needs to change, not us.

3. US and EU:

a) When Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth demanded in February that the EU should take responsibility for supporting Ukraine, the conventional defence of Europe, and the strengthening of the EU defence industry this was a logical demand in the longer term perspective, but today’s unpredictability can create new challenges.

b) One of the challenges: European defence capabilities, procured from the US defence industry are subject to the American ITAR regulation, which means that the keys to these defence systems are in the hands of American authorities. The situation being uncertain, Europeans worry if US weaponry under ITAR can still be relied upon. Some European small defence companies are now advertising their defence products to European governments in very simple terms: “Russia free, China free, ITAR free.”

c) European defence for the time being is heavily dependent on US strategic enablers. It will take a reasonable time for us to develop our own. On the other hand, it is also clear that there are important weapons systems we are not producing, and it will remain necessary to procure them from US industry.

What do we need to do?

We need a constructive agreement with the US on a rational transition towards European responsibility for European defence and we need a reasonable time to prepare ourselves.

We now need to avoid chaotic divorce. The best way forward is to present to our transatlantic partners our vision of longer term evolution towards our own responsibility for European security.

Our White Paper and Rearm Europe are just the beginning of what we need to do.

Defending Europe is a European task that demands taking care of a European security architecture.

These are the big tasks ahead of us, which we need to start to discuss without long delays. And which will bring new questions about the future of our transatlantic relations in security and defence.

But for the time being we need to tackle urgent matters first: immediate support to Ukraine and the big bang in our defence readiness. This is what the White Paper is about.

But my Mission Letter says, that we also need “to identify investment needs to deliver full-spectrum European defence capabilities”. “Full spectrum” means a lot. Maybe even “nuclear defence capabilities”. But that is for the next papers and for the next discussions.