Once Again About Defence Readiness
(based on Lithuanian language version, which was published on 30 October)
There has been a lot of talk lately about the defence readiness of the European Union. And of my country, Lithuania. And a lot is being done.
It is good that Lithuania is determined to allocate 5.38% of its GDP to defence next year. Other Eastern flank countries are going the same way.
For its part, the European Commission, proposed the ReArm.EU plan, which will allow to spend an additional 800 billion euros for defence. If Member States will implement their pledges to NATO, EU defence spending till 2035 will accumulate to the total amount of 6.8 trillion euros. The Commission also has approved an ambitious plan for the European Union’s Defence Readiness until 2030. It contains many ambitious goals that are also important for Lithuania: among the projects that are important for the whole of Europe are the Eastern Flank Watch and Drone Defence Initiative (Drone Wall).
We could rejoice at such decisions and results: a year ago, it was difficult to imagine that Europe would change so much in terms of defence. The threat of Putin’s aggression and changes in Washington D.C. have led the European Union to finally start taking care of its own defence readiness. And that is also a good thing.
However, we must not deceive ourselves and relax.
Not only because we still have a long way to go – for example, it has only now become clear that in all frontline states we are still not prepared to detect and record cross-border drone flights, and we are not prepared to destroy them using cost-effective means. It is good that we at least recognize this.
This revealed fundamental gaps in our “defensive thinking” and “defensive planning”: drones began to be used extensively on the Ukrainian front lines as early as 2023, but over the course of two years, our institutions (both national and European) took virtually no action to be ready for drone defence. Only Russia’s recent provocations finally provided the stimulus that prompted the whole of Europe to draw up urgent plans for a “drone wall” or “drone defence initiative.”
It has become clear that our institutional and political capacity to learn the lessons of the war in Ukraine is weak.
Therefore, without going into too much detail, it can be said very simply that we must always remember that defence readiness consists of three parts: material defence readiness, institutional defence readiness, and political defence readiness.
And all three parts require the utmost attention, because only then will we be prepared for defence.
Until now, we have mostly limited ourselves to material defence readiness: which armed forces we need to strengthen, how many and what weapons we need to purchase or manufacture, and how we should finance this properly.
This is important and necessary, but it is not enough on its own.
The institutional defence readiness of both Lithuania and the European Union is no less important. This includes the readiness of the institutions themselves and the institutional framework.
If national or European political or administrative institutions are unable to function properly either in preparation for defence or, even more so, in the event of aggression, then acquiring weapons will not help. Or the weapons that are acquired will not be the ones that are really needed in modern warfare. Even worse is having a completely ineffective government on a national level. It is equally bad not to think now about how we will organize our defence readiness at the European Union level when the US, refocusing itself on containing the Chinese growing military power, begins to reduce its resources allocated to European defence. In such a case – it would be bad not to start to think now how we shall build the European pillar of NATO. Or not to think about how we will integrate Ukraine’s military forces, which have been tested on the battlefield, into European defence capabilities and what kind of new defence institutional architecture we need to have in Europe in order to implement such an integration. Or not to ask ourselves the question what kind of institutional division of responsibilities we need to have on the EU and national level, in order to strengthen institutional synergies, to avoid duplications and to overcome fragmentation of our defence industries. Or not to prepare EU institutions to be ready to operate in the case of real crises, related to military aggression.
I call all of this – institutional defence readiness. It is clear that we have many gaps. And we still do not pay enough attention to such an institutional readiness. It is as if we think that the defence of our country or Europe can happen on its own, as long as we have enough weapons. Or that NATO will solve everything for us, even if our institutions are completely disorganized.
However, it is clear that NATO will not solve all our problems if we ourselves do not take care of our institutional defence readiness. Branches of national power (the Government, the Parliament, and the President) that operate in an effective manner, as well as public trust in them, are just as important for defence readiness as the number of tanks, cannons, or divisions. One cannot function without the other, and if one part of defence readiness (e.g., institutional) is completely weakened, the entire readiness will be weak.
Institutional defence readiness is more difficult to assess than material readiness. NATO does not set any clear criteria for assessing institutional defence readiness, as it does for material defence readiness, for which it sets a criterion of 3.5% of GDP for defence spending.
This undoubtedly makes it difficult to focus attention on institutional readiness, but at the same time it makes the task of ensuring institutional defence readiness even more important.
That is why we must constantly ask ourselves: are our institutions prepared for defence? If the country is unable to form a government, if a populist party is allowed to dominate the parliamentary majority, does this institutional situation strengthen or weaken the country’s readiness for defence?
The answer is quite clear.
The institutional aspect of defence readiness is closely linked to the third component – political defence readiness.
It is possible to have many weapons but still lack the political will to defend oneself. First and foremost, to lack the political will within the country’s most important institutions. Or the will of society to defend itself may be paralyzed.
The main goal of all of Russia’s hybrid wars against Europe is to break, destroy, and divide our political will to defend ourselves. The essence of the famous Gerasimov Doctrine, repeatedly mentioned by Russian leaders and experts, is that it is easier to occupy “hearts and minds” than territories. It is obvious that if Russia succeeds in occupying the “hearts and minds” of a democratic country, the physical occupation of that country becomes unnecessary or less important.
Therefore, the fundamental goal of our political defence readiness is clear: to cultivate and protect our national will to defend ourselves. To protect ourselves from Russia’s efforts to occupy our “hearts and minds.” Russia uses a wide variety of hybrid warfare elements to achieve this: pure propaganda, cyber attacks, or covert support for populism, which is usually friendly to the Kremlin, as well as “TikTok” support for election campaigns, or a plethora of sabotage and provocations to scare people and urge them to seek “good relations” with the Kremlin.
One could go on and on listing the various means Russia uses to achieve its goals of breaking our political will, rendering our most important institutions ineffective, exploiting our social weaknesses, and sowing seeds of mistrust, disappointment, and conflict. These seeds give rise to institutional incapacity and the erosion of political will.
We are well aware of how Russia is trying to weaken us all with its hybrid warfare. However, we must also admit that even though we know that we are under attack and how we are being attacked, our defence has been very weak so far, and we have paid very little attention to it. Perhaps we do not believe in ourselves, we do not believe that we can defend ourselves against this. Therefore, we usually limit our reaction to hybrid attacks to statements that we are “concerned” or “very deeply concerned.”
Political defence readiness requires proactive actions to defend our political will. The political will to defend ourselves. This requires more than just statements of “concern.” Protecting the political and social sphere from hybrid populism and Kremlin influence is the essence of political defence readiness, which requires active and effective action by institutions.
In the recent Moldovan parliamentary elections, the authorities demonstrated precisely this kind of action. Not only did this help protect the hearts and minds of voters from the Kremlin’s massive hybrid operation, but it also earned the support of the public in the elections.
A few weeks ago, in a special resolution on Russian provocations, the European Parliament called on the EU institutions to develop an action plan of measures preventing and countering the escalation of Russian hybrid warfare. Such a plan, according to the European Parliament, should enable the EU to take proactive countermeasures commensurate with the scale and severity of the hybrid provocations experienced by the European Union.
Europe is waking up. It has already realized that to defend itself against Russian drones and provocations, it needs to build a “drone wall.” To defend itself against hybrid provocations, it needs an “anti-hybrid” wall.
Russia is trying to weaken our political will to defend ourselves. We must defend ourselves against such hybrid aggression. To do this, we must first and foremost ensure that our political and social spheres remain clean, because populist mudslinging can spread and expand very quickly. Hybrid influences also spread through it. And we cannot expect our civil or cultural society to always be able to clean up this field if the Government or political institutions are unable to do so. Or if the institutions themselves are infected and spreading the infection.
Russia is looking for ways to weaken our political will to defend ourselves. We need to think not only about how to counter such hybrid Kremlin aggression, but also how to weaken the Kremlin’s political will to prepare for new aggression against us, including a hybrid aggression. We have completely neglected the issue of Russia’s aggressive political will aimed at weakening us, we do not have a proper strategy on Russia, even though it should be an important part of our political defence readiness.
It is time to understand that defence is not just about guns. They are important, but comprehensive defence requires not only material defence readiness, but also institutional and political defence readiness. This requires proactive action, not just publicly expressed concern.
Member States, including Lithuania, have every opportunity to demonstrate this. And not only demonstrate it, but also offer the European Union ways to implement it on a European scale. Because Member States must care not only about their own defence readiness, but also about the readiness of the entire European Union. Because security of each Member State also depends on such European readiness.
The European Union can help Lithuania in defence matters, but Lithuania can also help the European Union. It is also important for EU Member State, as Lithuania, to understand that defence readiness encompasses not only material defence readiness, but also institutional and political defence readiness. Do we really care about this?
Let’s not forget it!
