“The Eastern Flank Watch” And “The European Drone Defence Initiative”
In recent days and weeks there has been significant interest in the so called European ‘Drone Wall’ project. Although the idea is not a new one, it became the center of public attention following the Russian provocation of a drone intrusion into Poland, and after Commission President Ursula von der Leyen identified this potential initiative in her State of the Union address as one of the priority projects for the European Union. The ‘Drone Wall’ idea was also discussed in the informal EUCO, where it raised some questions: is the name ‘wall’ not misleading? Is it really a ‘wall’? Can the ‘wall’ stop all drones? What is the benefit to other EU Member States, that are not on the frontier?
The issue reached broader audiences and was widely debated by experts and politicians. And I wholeheartedly welcome this debate. Such far-ranging EU flagship initiatives deserve deep analysis and wide discussion. Discussions not only about the title ‘Drone Wall’: titles of initiatives can be changed, but the substance should stay the same.
In order to avoid misleading discussions about the title, recently it was agreed to change the title of ‘Drone Wall’ into ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’. Time will show which title is preferable to European citizens, to different regions and different communities.
Let me share my personal view on the development of the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ project, outlining its key components and stages of development, and how it should fit with the needs of all EU Member States and with the more specific regional project of the Eastern Flank Watch, as referred to by the President of the European Commission.
On the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’
Before going into a more detailed analysis of what kind of ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ we need to develop, let’s have a very clear picture of what the Russian drone provocations have revealed.
First of all, we need to admit that most EU Member States lack modern capabilities to detect drones and destroy drones in a cost-effective way.
The Ukrainians very rapidly developed all these capabilities when both sides started to intensively use drones from 2023 onward. The Ukrainians managed to build their own ‘drone wall’. Now we can learn a lot from Ukraine. The only question is – which is difficult to answer – why did it take us two years to understand that we also need to build European capabilities and develop our ‘European drone defence initiative’? This should serve as an important political lesson to us: modern warfare is changing very rapidly, and we need to be able to adapt, sooner rather than later.
Taking into account Ukrainian experience, it is clear that the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ will establish a system of systems aimed to counter drones, that in the case of European Union Member States will operate in different ways in peacetime or wartime.
While the Eastern border Member States face the greatest direct threat from Russia and Belarus, the capabilities forming drone defence should be developed within a broader European approach to counter threats from drones in all domains in Europe.
Europe as a whole need to be able to scale up anti-drone capabilities rapidly in case of increased aggression, to secure the borders and populations from massive drone attacks as seen in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian experience shows that it is impossible to destroy 100% of the enemy’s unmanned ariel systems and vehicles – drones, but it is possible to destroy 70-80% of them. Especially near strategic objects, which need to have a concentration of anti-drone capabilities.
And according to Ukrainian experience, it’s possible to detect all of the drones and to track them. Wherever they are coming from: crossing the land border, crossing the frontline or appearing from the sea.
In the case of war, we need to be ready to achieve that in all of Europe.
In addition, Ukraine also teaches us that during war it is possible to use drones to destroy 80% of the enemy’s ground targets. And maritime targets.
We need to build a multi-layered, deep zone of technologically advanced systems with interoperable anti-drone capabilities for detection, tracking, and neutralization, as well as capabilities to hit ground targets using drone technology for precision strikes, especially in frontier countries. This is what the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ is about.
Ukrainian experience suggests that the system of systems with the title ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’, could consist of several clear, essential components:
- Detection capabilities: Various technological means (real time space intelligence data; acoustic sensors, other types of sensors, different types of electronic radar, visual capabilities) necessary to detect, identify and track enemy drones, ground forces or hybrid threats crossing or preparing to cross the border or frontline. Radar or other detection capabilities need to be united into a regional ‘Detection Network’ to effectively exchange data and to be able to track drones or other targets.
- Intelligence management capabilities: Participant countries need to have compatible and interoperable situational awareness and battle management systems to collectively identify targets, plan and carry out operations. The ‘Delta’ system developed in Ukraine is a good example of such a system.
- Anti-drone capabilities: The technological means to destroy or disarm enemy drones such as drone-interceptors; electronic warfare tools to disarm enemy drones; ground or air based anti-drone zenith artillery or anti-drone missile systems and mobile groups; anti-drone laser systems, etc.
- Anti-invader capabilities: Using FPV drones and other type of drones to destroy invading enemy ground forces in the border or frontline region.
- Deep-strike capabilities in order to be ready to carry out deep-strikes into enemy territory in the case of enemy invasion.
It is important to understand that the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’s’ capability to destroy the adversary’s drones and to use drones in order to hit military targets on land or at sea will have a different architecture in different regions and different countries: one architecture is needed for frontier countries, a different architecture for countries like Denmark or Germany.
In frontier countries there is a need for a regional coordinated approach in order to develop an effective regional ‘Drone Defence’ with all necessary components, including capabilities to hit the targets on the ground. In other countries the approach can be more individual, with concentration only on detection, intelligence management and anti-drone capabilities, also having in mind that detection and drone capabilities can be very useful to protect borders against illegal migration, or can be effective to manage other type of crises or natural disasters.
The implementation of the ‘Drone Wall’ should start with the development of the ‘anti-drone capabilities’ component, which demands simultaneous development of the ‘detection capabilities’ and ‘intelligence management capabilities’.
Development of European ‘Drone Wall’ capabilities will benefit the entire European Union and all EU Member States, since the systemic and industrial knowledge and know-how of modern warfare will start to spread all over Europe and into industries of different EU Member States. Here Ukrainian industry should be included in joint ventures with European companies to enhance innovative tech solutions and ability to ramp up drone production capacity.
According to several experts, a partial but substantial development of ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ capabilities can be achieved during the first year of the project’s effective implementation. At least that is what Ukrainians managed to achieve when they built their own ‘Drone Wall’.
In the development of the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ special attention should be paid to Ukrainian experience. This experience shows that the key to an effective ‘Drone Defence’ is not technology as such, but the developed skills of integrated command and the creation of a comprehensive new warfare ‘ecosystem’. This demands integration of capabilities of localized drone production with planning, execution and evaluation of military operations, all within a holistic management system.
To successfully implement the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ project, it is essential to establish an integrated regional system for training of national command units, responsible for its realization. That is where Ukrainian experience can bring a lot of added value for the whole EU.
There are different options for financing the implementation of the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’. Some experts from Poland and the Baltic States in their concept note estimated that a regional ‘Drone wall’ project, covering only those 4 countries, might cost around 1 billion euros.
In the frontier countries ‘Drone defence’ capabilities are one of the elements of a broader Eastern Flank Watch project that can be devoted to strengthening defence capabilities in the region.
On the Eastern Flank Watch
The Eastern Flank Watch could be viewed and developed as a European Flagship project, designed to strengthen defence capabilities of frontier countries threatened by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The Eastern Flank Watch project could be used to assist the development of defence capabilities in participating countries, addressing the need to defend ground, air and sea borders (in the Baltic and Black Sea) with Russia or Belarus against possible Russian military or hybrid aggression.
The two most important components of the Eastern Flank Watch will be the ‘Ground Wall’ and the ‘Drone Wall.’
The ‘Ground Wall’ should consist of all possible “classical” means to inhibit ground mobility of enemy troops in the border region: dragon teeth, anti-tank trenches, natural barriers such as forests and swamps, etc. The ‘Drone Wall’ here comes with additional capabilities to hit ground targets in the same border region using drone technology for precision strikes. The enhanced defence capabilities in the border region can metaphorically remind of a ‘Defence Wall’. That is why it became popular in the region also to speak about the ‘Drone Wall’.
The Eastern Flank Watch project might seek to use the experience and expertise of Ukrainian defence forces as much as possible, especially in developing and realizing ‘“Drone defence’ concept and capabilities necessary.
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These are initial thoughts what the ‘European Drone Defence Initiative’ can mean in reality, and what kind of Eastern Flank Watch we need to build. We must act quickly. We do not have the luxury of time. Our societies need assurances that we shall be able to protect them. Not only against aggression, but also against provocations. We can predict that, in the nearest future, Russian provocations against us will only increase in size, frequency, and in newer kinds of methods. We can expect this threat to continue for a number of years. We need to be ready. With different types of walls and initiatives.
